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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Epidemiological  models  of  inﬂuenza  transmission  usually  assume  that  recovered  individuals  instantly
develop  a fully  protective  immunity  against  the  infecting  strain.  However,  recent  studies  have  highlighted
host heterogeneity  in the development  of  this  immune  response,  characterized  by delay  and  even  absence
of  protection,  that  could  lead to homologous  reinfection  (HR).  Here,  we  investigate  how  these  immuno-
logical  mechanisms  at the individual  level  shape  the  epidemiological  dynamics  at  the  population  level.  In
particular,  because  HR  was observed  during  the  successive  waves  of  past pandemics,  we  assess  its  role  in
driving  multiple-wave  inﬂuenza  outbreaks.  We  develop  a novel  mechanistic  model  accounting  for  host
heterogeneity  in  the immune  response.  Immunological  parameters  are  inferred  by ﬁtting  our dynamical
model  to a two-wave  inﬂuenza  epidemic  that  occurred  on the  remote  island  of Tristan  da Cunha  (TdC)  in
1971, and  during  which  HR  occurred  in 92  of  284  islanders.  We  then  explore  the  dynamics  predicted  by
our model  for various  population  settings.  We  ﬁnd  that  our  model  can  explain  HR  over both  short  (e.g.
week) and  long  (e.g.  month)  time-scales,  as reported  during  past pandemics.  In  particular,  our results
reveal  that  the  HR  wave  on TdC  was a natural  consequence  of the exceptional  contact  conﬁguration  and
high  susceptibility  of  this  small  and  isolated  community.  By  contrast,  in larger,  less mixed  and  partially
protected  populations,  HR  alone  cannot  generate  multiple-wave  outbreaks.  However,  in  the  latter  case,
we ﬁnd  that a signiﬁcant  proportion  of infected  hosts  would  remain  unprotected  at  the  end  of  the pan-
demic  season  and  should  therefore  beneﬁt  from  vaccination.  Crucially,  we  show  that  failing  to  account
for  these  unprotected  individuals  can  lead  to large  underestimation  of the  magnitude  of  the  ﬁrst  post-
pandemic  season.  These  results  are  relevant  in  the context  of  the  2009  A/H1N1  inﬂuenza  post-pandemic
era.
©  2013  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  All rights  reserved.
Introduction
Mathematical models of infectious diseases often rely on a com-
partmental description in order to reduce the population diversity
to a few key characteristics which are relevant to the infection
under consideration. An extensively used model for inﬂuenza infec-
tion is of susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed (SEIR) form:
after exposure to the virus, susceptible hosts (S) pass through an
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Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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exposed state (E) of latent infection, become infectious (I) and are
ﬁnally removed (R) from the infectious pool as they simultaneously
recover (or die) and acquire permanent protection against the
infecting strain. The SEIR model was particularly successful during
the 2009 pandemic in estimating the key transmission parameters
of the novel H1N1 virus (nH1N1) (Fraser et al., 2009) and assessing
the effectiveness of alternative vaccination strategies (Baguelin
et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, proper consideration of the primary immune
response, which occurs on the ﬁrst exposure to a novel inﬂuenza
virus, motivates a more accurate description of the different stages
from recovery to development of long-term protective immunity.
Indeed, the primary immune response to inﬂuenza in humans
operates on two different time scales. Usually, the viral load is
cleared by the innate and cellular immune responses within a few
days following infection (Woodland, 2003), thus leading to recov-
ery of infected hosts. By contrast, the humoral (antibody-mediated)
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immune response, which provides long-term protection against
the infecting strain as well as closely related strains (Fairlie-Clarke
et al., 2008), takes several weeks to become efﬁcient (Cox et al.,
2004; Miller et al., 2010; Baguelin et al., 2011). Finally, at the pop-
ulation level, there is host heterogeneity in the development of
this long-term protective immunity as some individuals show high
antibody titres shortly after recovery whereas some other fail to
reach a protective level (Cox et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2010; Chen
et al., 2010; Hung et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2011).
In a recent study, Camacho et al. (2011) showed that a precise
account of these host heterogenities was necessary to explain the
reinfection episodes reported during the “natural experiment” of
Tristan da Cunha (TdC), a remote island that underwent a two-wave
A/H3N2 inﬂuenza epidemic in 1971 (Mantle and Tyrrell, 1973).
More precisely, in the next few days that followed its introduction,
the virus spread rapidly throughout the whole island population
and after three weeks of propagation, 273 (96%) of 284 islanders
had been infected. However, while the epidemic was nearing its
end, several recovered islanders developed a second illness, thus
initiating the second epidemic wave during which at least 92 (32%)
islanders were reinfected (see section “Data” for more details). The
main ﬁnding of Camacho et al. (2011) is that, among six biologically
realistic reinfection mechanisms, only two could be retained: some
hosts with either a delayed or deﬁcient humoral immune response
to the primary inﬂuenza infection were reinfected following rapid
re-exposure to the same strain. This historical event illustrates that
host heterogeneity at the individual level can not only lead to HR
but also shape the epidemiological dynamics by triggering a second
epidemic wave.
Historically, multiple-wave outbreaks and rapid reinfections
have commonly been observed during inﬂuenza pandemics. The
most striking example remains the “Spanish” inﬂuenza pandemic
of 1918–1919 that occurred in three waves (Taubenberger and
Morens, 2006) and during which several reinfection episodes were
reported, sometimes in proportions similar to that of the 1971 TdC
epidemic (Medical Department of the Local Government Board,
1919; Ministry Of Health, 1920; Barry et al., 2008). However, the
three epidemic waves in 1918–1919 were spread out over 9 months
(Taubenberger and Morens, 2006) whereas the two-wave epidemic
on TdC lasted only 59 days (Mantle and Tyrrell, 1973). Accordingly,
the time-scale between successive infections in the same individ-
ual was of the order of months during the pandemic whereas it was
of the order of a few weeks for the TdC islanders, thus questioning
their common underlying biological mechanisms. More recently,
many populations experienced a spring and a fall waves during
the 2009 pandemic and several cases of HR were virologically con-
ﬁrmed (Perez et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2010). Most of these HR
episodes occurred within 2–3 weeks following recovery, a time-
scale similar to that observed among the TdC islanders. However,
both infection and HR occurred over the same epidemic wave in
2009 whereas they were separated across both waves in TdC, thus
questioning the role of HR in driving multiple-wave outbreaks.
Overall, these observations call for clariﬁcation of the signiﬁ-
cance of HR and its role in driving multiple-wave outbreaks during
pandemics. In particular, to what extent a better consideration of
the immunological dynamics may  be important in epidemiological
models of inﬂuenza pandemics? In order to investigate these issues,
we propose to explore and characterize the interplay between the
immunological and epidemiological dynamics of a novel inﬂuenza
virus. We  start by deﬁning an extended SEIR model accounting
for the primary immune response to inﬂuenza and its inherent
host heterogeneity. Using a maximum-likelihood (ML) approach,
we confront our mechanistic model with the time-series of the
daily incidence counts of the 1971 TdC epidemic and obtain ML
estimates for the key immunological parameters. This analysis also
reveals the exceptional setting of the TdC population and lead us
to explore the impact of HR on the epidemiological dynamics for
various population settings. We  conclude with a discussion on the
role of HR in the current post-pandemic era.
Materials and methods
The primary immune response to inﬂuenza infection in humans
A multi-pronged innate (McGill et al., 2009) and adaptive
(Brown et al., 2004) immune response has been described for
clearing inﬂuenza infection. The innate response is the ﬁrst to be
activated and plays a key role through its ability to control early
viral replication and to promote and regulate the virus-speciﬁc
adaptive immune response (McGill et al., 2009). The adaptive
response itself may  be broken into two  critical sub-components: (i)
the cellular immune response by which antigen-speciﬁc cytotoxic
T lymphocytes (CTLs) eliminate infected cells and thus prevent viral
release; and (ii) the humoral immune response by which serum and
mucosal antibodies efﬁciently neutralize the virus (as explained in
Text S1 the separation between serum and mucosal antibodies is
not necessary for our study). Antibodies can remain detectable for
years after infection and prevent reinfection by the same strain as
well as by sufﬁciently cross-reactive variants (Fairlie-Clarke et al.,
2008). Genetic variation in any of these immune components might
determine whether or how rapidly an individual develops protec-
tive immunity following inﬂuenza infection.
As schematized in Fig. 1A, it is important to note that, during
a primary inﬂuenza infection, the innate and cellular responses
(blue curve) play the key role in viral clearance whereas neu-
tralizing antibodies (green curve) are generated later and do not
play a signiﬁcant role unless the viral load is high and sustained
(Woodland, 2003). The primary CTL response is detectable in blood
after 6–14 days whereas the neutralizing antibody response peaks
at 4–6 weeks (Cox et al., 2004). Critically, the CTL response is down-
regulated after viral clearance (Woodland, 2003), disappears by day
21 post-infection (Cox et al., 2004) and is followed by a state of
immunological “memory” with antigen-speciﬁc T cells. The mem-
ory cells cannot prevent HR as well as speciﬁc antibodies could,
but they can reduce the severity of the disease (Woodland, 2003).
Finally, it has been reported that a serum or mucosal antibody
response cannot be detected in approximately 10 to 20% of sub-
jects after natural inﬂuenza infection (Cox et al., 2004; Tamura and
Kurata, 2004; Miller et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Hung et al., 2010;
Chan et al., 2011).
Mechanistic modelling
Fig. 1B shows the SEICWH model which extends the classical
SEIR model to account for the dynamics and host heterogeneity of
the primary immune response to inﬂuenza in humans. Following
recovery, hosts remain temporarily protected against HR thanks to
the cellular response. Accordingly, they enter the C stage (cellular
protection). Then, following down-regulation of the CTL response,
the humoral response has a probability  ˛ to reach a level sufﬁ-
cient to protect against HR. In this case, recovered hosts enter the
H stage (humoral protection) but otherwise they remain unpro-
tected and re-enter the susceptible pool (S). Finally, in order to
account for potential delay between completion of CTL contraction
and full development of the neutralizing antibody response, recov-
ered hosts pass through a time window of susceptibility (W)  before
entering the H stage. Crucially, while in the W stage, individuals can
be reinfected following re-exposure to the same strain
In order to account for host heterogeneity in the development of
the immune response, we use a stochastic framework to simulate
the durations of the successive immunological stages. Deﬁning E,
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Fig. 1. Mechanistic modelling of the primary immune response to inﬂuenza. (A) Schematized dynamics of the viral load as well as the innate and adaptive immune responses,
as  described in section “The primary immune response to inﬂuenza infection in humans”. (B) The SEICWH model. The six immunological stages are S: susceptible, E: exposed,
I:  clinically ill and infectious, C: temporarily protected by the cellular response, W:  temporarily susceptible, H: protected on the long-term by the humoral response. The
number of sub-compartments in each immunological stages corresponds to the shape of the Erlang distribution for the residence time in this stage (see section “Mechanistic
modelling”). The infection force is  = ˇ(I1 + I2)/˝. A description of the parameters can be found in Table 2. The transition rates used to stochastically simulate the model are
provided in Table 1. The set of ordinary differential equations used for deterministic simulations can be found in Text S3.
I, C and W as the times spent by an infected host in the indexed
immunological stages, we assume that these four random vari-
ables follow independent Erlang distributions with shapes kE, kI,
kC and kW and means −1, −1, −1 and ω−1, respectively. Erlang
distribution with mean m and shape k is modelled by k consec-
utive sub-stages, each being exponentially distributed with mean
m/k. As illustrated in Fig. S1 the ﬂexibility of the Erlang distribution
ranges from the exponential (k = 1) to Gaussian-like (k  1) distri-
butions. In particular, whenever k > 1 the memory-less property of
the exponential distribution is lost, thus providing more realistic
distribution for biological processes with delays such as recovery
or contraction of the CTL response (Wearing et al., 2005). In Fig. 1B,
as well as in the rest of the paper, we use kE = kI = 2, kW = 1 and
kC = 5. Justiﬁcation of these values is provided in section “Parameter
inference via maximum likelihood”.
Finally, regarding disease transmission, we make the standard
assumptions of a well mixed, isolated and constant size (= ˝)  pop-
ulation, as well as a constant contact rate (= ˇ) among individuals.
These simpliﬁcations permit us (i) to focus on the direct impacts
of the immunological mechanisms on the epidemic dynamics; and
(ii) to rapidly assess these impacts for various population settings,
i.e. contact rates. We  refer to the last section of this paper for a dis-
cussion on the inclusion of further reﬁnements in the transmission
mechanisms.
Data
The data counts are clinical records based on symptom obser-
vation and were drawn from the notes taken during the regular
work of the local practice who visited all but three houses during
the course of the epidemic in TdC (Mantle and Tyrrell, 1973). In
addition, blood sample of 11 individuals provided serological con-
ﬁrmation of the circulation of A/H3N2 on the island, a subtype to
which the TdC population had never been exposed before 1971.
We refer to the paper of Mantle and Tyrrell (1973) for a detailed
description of the 1971 data set as well as to the paper of Camacho
et al. (2011) for a summary of the inﬂuenza experiences in TdC
before 1971.
We note that the data are not available at the individual level.
However, since the data set consists of 312 cases for 284 islanders
some individuals must appear twice in the data counts. More pre-
cisely, in their original article, Mantle and Tyrrell (1973) states that
among the 284 islanders 273 were infected at least once whereas
92 were reinfected. Unfortunately, only 312 of the 365 total cases
were recorded with daily precision and were included in their data
set (Mantle and Tyrrell, 1973) which is reproduced in Fig. 2 (black
dots). As such, we can only conclude that at least 49 HR cases appear
in the data.
Simulation
Our aim is (i) to ﬁt the SEICWH model to the 1971 TdC epidemic
in order to estimate the immunological parameters (, ,  , ω, ˛)
and (ii) to explore the model dynamics for various population sett-
ings. For this purpose, we  used both stochastic and deterministic
simulations of the SEICWH model, as we now explain.
In a previous study, Camacho et al. (2011) showed that, given
the small population of TdC, demographic stochasticity should
be taken into account when ﬁtting a mechanistic model to the
1971 TdC epidemic. This is because the risk of epidemic fade-out
during the trough between waves depends on the model param-
eters and must therefore be accounted for when maximizing the
likelihood over the parameter space. Accordingly, we  exclusively
resorted to stochastic simulations to ﬁt the 1971 TdC epidemic.
In the stochastic SEICWH model, the number of individuals in each
immunological (sub-)stage is a discrete random variable and a pos-
sible state of the population at time t is deﬁned by the random
vector
X(t) = (S(t), E1:2(t), I1:2(t), C1:5(t), W(t), H(t))
where C1:5 ≡ C1, . . .,  C5 (and similarly for I1:2 and E1:2). The state of
the population at time t is therefore a realization
x(t) = (s(t), e1:2(t), i1:2(t), c1:5(t), w(t), h(t))
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Fig. 2. Detailed analysis of the 105 realizations of the stochastic SEICWH model for
the  1971 TdC epidemic using Gillespie’s algorithm (Gillespie, 1977). Upper panel:
original incidence data (black dots) and expected incidence (red line) conditioned on
non-extinction under the best ﬁt model together with 50 and 95 percentile intervals
(red envelopes) due to demographic stochasticity. This ﬁgure demonstrates that the
best  ﬁt of the SEICWH model captures the shape and the dynamics of the data. Lower
panel: time course of the extinction probability p(t) deﬁned as the probability that
the  epidemic has faded out by time t and estimated by the proportion of fade-out
realizations at time t. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
of X(t). The time course of x(t) is led by the possible transitions
described in Table 1 and was simulated using Gillespie’s exact algo-
rithm (Gillespie, 1977).
Our second aim was to explore the dynamics of the SEICWH
model over a wide range of parameter values. In this context,
stochastic simulations become computationally intensive and one
is tempted to resort on deterministic simulations for the sake
of efﬁciency. However, this approximation is acceptable only as
one controls that the stochastic effects should remain negligible.
Accordingly, we assessed that the inter-wave extinction probability
remains negligible (p < 10−3) in the parameter range explored (see
Text S3), thus justifying the use of a deterministic approximation.
In the deterministic SEICWH model, the state of the population x(t)
becomes a continuous variable governed by a set of ordinary differ-
ential equations (given in Text S3) that can be obtained by the large
population limit (˝→ ∞)  of the stochastic process (Kurtz, 1971).
Table 1
Transitions between classes in the stochastic SEICWH model. The notation A → B
means that when the event occurs one individual is transferred from compartment
A  to compartment B.
Event Transition Rate at which
event occurs
(re)Infection S → E1 ˇs(i1 + i2)/˝
W → E1 ˇw(i1 + i2)/˝
Progression of incubation E1 → E2 2e1
Start of infectiosity E2 → I1 2e2
Progression of infectiosity I1 → I2 2i1
Recovery I2 → C1 2i2
Progressive loss of cellular protection Ck → Ck+1 5ck
Deﬁciency of humoral response C5 → S (1 − ˛)5c5
Start of the window of susceptibility C5 → W ˛5c5
Start of the humoral protection W → H ωw
These equations were numerically integrated using the fourth-
order Runge-Kutta routine of the GSL library (Galassi et al., 2010).
Parameter inference via maximum likelihood
For a time series y1:T of T successive observations and a state-
space model with parameter vector , the likelihood is given by
L() = P(y1:T |). For our stochastic model, the likelihood is analyti-
cally intractable and we  resorted to an iterated ﬁltering procedure
which converges to the ML  parameter estimate (ML) to the inci-
dence data (Ionides et al., 2006) (code available upon request). In
short, this inference framework only requires: (i) an algorithm to
simulate the stochastic model; and (ii) an observation process to
link the model-predicted incidence (i.e. the daily number of new
hosts entering the infectious class I1) to the daily incidence counts
reported in the data set. Following Camacho et al. (2011), we used
Gillespie’s algorithm for model simulation and a Poisson process,
whose reporting rate 	 was  also inferred, for observation. We  per-
formed log-likelihood proﬁles in order to check convergence to
the maximum likelihood and to calculate 95% conﬁdence intervals
(CI95%) for parameter estimates.
A detailed description of the inference procedure can be found in
the Supplementary Material of Camacho et al. (2011). In particular,
it is shown that, in contrast to the other parameters, inference of the
shape parameters kE, kI, kC and kW is computationally too expen-
sive. To tackle this issue, we followed Wearing et al. (2005) who
ﬁtted a SEIR model to an inﬂuenza epidemic in a boarding school
and obtained the best ﬁt for kE = kI = 2. Then, we performed sensi-
tivity analyses on kC and kW and found that, whatever the value of
kC, the likelihood was maximized when kW = 1 (results not shown).
Finally, we  performed a log-likelihood proﬁle on kC and found the
maximum at kC = 5. In the remainder of this paper we therefore ﬁx
kE = kI = 2, kW = 1 and kC = 5 and obtain the model of Fig. 1B.
Quantities of epidemiological interest
Our detailed description of the different immunological stages
allows us to derive several quantities of epidemiological interest.
We denote by  the time elapsed since the start of the infectious
period and deﬁne the following probabilities:
• P1() = P[I > ] = 1 −
∫ 
0
fI(t)dt, the probability that, at time ,
the host is still infectious,
• P2() = P[I + C > ] = 1 −
∫ 
0
fIC (t)dt, the probability that, at
time , the host is still temporarily protected against HR thanks
to the innate and cellular immunity,
• P3() = P[I + C + W < ] = ˛
∫ 
0
fICW (t)dt, the probability that,
at time , the host is already protected on the long-term against
HR thanks to the humoral immunity,
• P4() = 1 − P2() − P3(), the probability that, at time , the host is
unprotected and can potentially suffer from HR if re-exposed,
where fIC is the probability density function of I + C and simi-
larly for fICW. The probability distributions P1–4 were computed via
Monte-Carlo integration.
These probability distributions can be compared with empirical
ones obtained from volunteer challenge studies (Carrat et al., 2008)
or population surveys during natural infections (Miller et al., 2010;
Hung et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2011). In a recent study, Baguelin et al.
(2011) ﬁtted a Weibull distribution to a data set consisting of 115
time intervals to seroconversion that were obtained from a serolog-
ical survey during the second wave of the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic
in the UK (Miller et al., 2010). More precisely, the authors deﬁned
the seroconversion interval of each individual as the time taken
since symptom onset to reach an hemagglutination-inhibition (HI)
titre of ≥32 (Baguelin et al., 2011). Historically, HI assay has been
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considered to be the gold standard for evaluation of the humoral
serum response, with an HI titre of ≥32 considered as a surrogate
marker for recent infection during the 2009 pandemic (Hardelid
et al., 2010). We  investigated the link between seroconversion and
efﬁcient protection by comparing the Weibull distribution obtained
by Baguelin et al. (2011) to the distribution P3() under our ML
parameter estimates. For this purpose we implicitly assume that
the time of inﬂuenza symptom onset coincides with the start of the
infectious period.
In order to assess the impact of HR on the epidemiological
dynamics, we deﬁne the fraction of the population that was (i)
infected at least once (FI.), (ii) reinfected (FII.) and iii) infected
only once but remains unprotected (FIS) at the end of the epi-
demic. We  note however that the model presented in Fig. 1B does
not allow us to compute these fractions since it only tracks the
epidemiological status of individuals (e.g. susceptible, infectious,
protected) rather than their infection and immunological histories.
For instance, it is impossible to distinguish between those infected
only once and those reinfected (they all pass through the same
stages), nor between those susceptible who escaped infection and
those unprotected who escaped reinfection (they all end in the S
class). To tackle this issue, we developed a version of the SEICWH
model that allows us to track both the infection and the immuno-
logical histories of individuals and used this model to compute FI.,
FII. and FIS. Since this model is of much higher dimension than that
of Fig. 1B, we refer to Text S4 for a more detailed description.
Finally, we deﬁne the daily inﬂow of unprotected hosts Ud by
counting the number of recovered hosts who lose their tempo-
rary immunity conferred by the cellular protection (i.e. leave the
C5 compartment) during day d, independently of the outcome of
their humoral response.
Exploration
Human communities differ from each other in their con-
tact structure. We  seek to characterize the interplay between
the immunological and epidemiological dynamics of the SEICWH
model for various contact rates (ˇ) ranging from highly to less
mixed populations. We  keep the immunological parameters con-
stant and equal to those inferred from the 1971 TdC epidemic. We
can thus express changes in the contact rate in terms of the more
meaningful basic reproduction number (R0 = ˇ/).
We then focus on the ﬁrst post-pandemic inﬂuenza seasons and
seek to determine under which conditions a subsequent variant
to the pandemic strain can break population herd immunity, thus
leading to a typical seasonal epidemic. Rapid evolution of the pan-
demic strain through mutations mainly results in changes of its
antigenic properties and/or its transmissibility. Other properties
such as the duration of the infectious period could also evolve but
we keep them constant for simplicity. As such, evolution of the
transmissibility translates into a difference 
R0 between the basic
reproduction number of the mutated variant and that of the pan-
demic strain. On the other hand, antigenic evolution is modelled
through an immune escape factor  ∈ [0, 1] which corresponds to
the proportion of antigenic properties of the mutated variant that
differs from the pandemic strain. For instance,  = 0 means that
both the pandemic and the mutant strain share the same anti-
genic properties. Finally, we assume that immune escape translates
into cross-immunity by reducing the susceptibility against infec-
tion by the new variant by a multiplicative factor 1 − . As such,
individuals who have developed a protective humoral response to
the pandemic strain are partially protected against infection by the
mutant strain whereas those who escaped infection or remained
unprotected at the end of the pandemic season are fully suscepti-
ble. As detailed in Text S5, previous empirical and modelling studies
suggest a relative increase of the transmissibility 
R0/R0 ∈ [0, 1] as
well as an immune escape  ∈ [0, 0.5] for a post-pandemic variant.
In the following, we explore these parameter ranges.
Results
Parameter inference
ML  estimates and CI95% for the parameter set are presented
in Table 2. Our estimates reveal the exceptional epidemiologi-
cal context of the 1971 epidemic, in the small and fully isolated
TdC community, characterized by a high contact rate among the
islanders (R0 = 11.78, CI95% = [7.7–25.5]), as well as a very low
level of pre-existing immunity at the beginning of the epidemic
(S0/ ≈ 98 %, [97–99]), the origin of which we speculate upon in
Text S6. ML  estimates of the generation time (average time between
primary and secondary cases: 3.34 days [2.53–4.7]) and of the
reporting rate in the data counts (due to asymptomatic infections
and observation errors: 71%, [62–82]) are in good agreement with
those previously published (Carrat et al., 2008). Similarly, we  ﬁnd
that 17%, [0–51] of the infected islanders did not mount an efﬁcient
humoral immune response, which is in the range of the estimates
available in the literature (Cox et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2010; Chen
et al., 2010). Finally, ML  estimates of the duration of the short-term
protection (13.37 days [10.37–16.31]) that follows recovery and of
the window of susceptibility (2.75 days [0–6.03]) that precedes the
establishment of a long-term humoral protection are both in good
agreement with the timings of the completion of the CTLs contrac-
tion (Cowling et al., 2012) and the peak of neutralizing antibodies
(see section “The primary immune response to inﬂuenza infection
in humans”).
We  note that the CI95% of the mean window of susceptibil-
ity (ω−1) contains 0 which could suggest a more parsimonious
model. However, as we show in Text S7, the broad CI95% of ω−1
is due to a strong correlation with the parameter  ˛ (the probability
to mount an efﬁcient humoral response). In particular, the lower
bound ω−1 = 0 corresponds to values of ˛∼ 50 % that are far below
empirical estimates found in the literature (∼80–90%). Conversely,
we show that ﬁxing ˛∼80–90% leads to a much tighter CI95% for ω−1
that excludes 0. As such, we  conclude that despite its broad CI95%
the window of susceptibility is justiﬁed for the sake of biological
realism.
Immunodynamics
The immunodynamics under our ML  estimates is summarized
in Fig. 3. In particular, we  ﬁnd that the waiting time in the win-
dow of susceptibility is exponentially distributed, thus revealing a
high level of host heterogeneity in the development of the humoral
response. Indeed, among those who do mount a protective humoral
immune response (83% of the population), 30% will stay in the win-
dow of susceptibility less than one day and 20% more than four days
(see Fig. S1, green curve). It also shows that, at the population level,
the probability P4() to sample an unprotected individual rapidly
peaks to 0.25 three weeks after the date of symptom onset, owing
to the window of susceptibility, and then decreases to (1 − ˛) = 0.17
on a longer time scale due to the lack of humoral protection.
Finally, we  investigate the link between seroconversion and
efﬁcient protection by comparing the cumulative distribution
obtained by Baguelin et al. (2011) with our probability distribu-
tion P3. Fig. 3 suggests that seroconversion occurs faster (∼1 week)
and in a slightly greater proportion of infected hosts (87% vs. 83%)
than efﬁcient protection. We discuss this discrepancy in section
“Immunodynamics model”.
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Table 2
Results of the maximum likelihood statistical inference for the 1971 TdC epidemic. ML  estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals for the SEICWH model parameters.
Symbol Description Estimate CI95%
R0 = ˇ/ Basic reproduction number 11.78 7.70–25.50
1/ Mean latent period (days) 2.18 1.53–2.96
1/  mean infectious period (days) 2.32 0.70–5.03
1/  Mean temporary removed period (days) 13.37 10.37–16.31
1/ω  Mean duration of the reinfection window (days) 2.75 0–6.03
˛  Probability to develop long-term immunity 0.83 0.49–1
	  Reporting rate for observation 0.71 0.62–0.82
I0 Number of initially infectious individuals 1 1–3
S0 Number of initially susceptible individuals 277 275–280
l(ML) Maximized log-likelihood −112.19 –
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 20 40 60
days since symptom onset
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 in
di
vid
ua
ls
infectious short-term
 protection
long-term
 protection unprote cted
seroconversion (HI  > 32)
(Baguelin et al. 2011)
Fig. 3. Dynamics of the immune response, under the SEICWH model, inferred from
the  1971 TdC epidemic. At the population level, our framework allows us to recon-
struct the proportion of individuals that are infectious (dotted black line), short-term
protected thanks to the innate and cellular immunity (dot-dashed black line), pro-
tected on the long-term thanks to antibodies (dashed black line) and unprotected
(solid black line) by interval since symptom onset. These proportions correspond,
respectively, to the probabilities P1–4() described in section “Quantities of epidemi-
ological interest”. The dashed red line corresponds to the proportion of individuals
seroconverted by interval since symptom onset obtained by Baguelin et al. (2011).
This study involved 115 individuals infected during the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic and
the  seroconversion interval of each individual was deﬁned as the time taken to reach
an  HI titre of ≥32. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the web  version of the article.)
Model ﬁt
In order to better characterize the 1971 two-wave epidemic on
TdC, we simulated 105 realizations of the stochastic SEICWH model
(Fig. 1B) under the ML  estimates (Table 2) and computed the 50 and
95 percentile intervals (PI50,95%) of the distribution conditioned on
non extinction. Fig. 2 (upper panel) demonstrates the goodness of
ﬁt of the SEICWH model since the data lie in the PI95% while the
shape and dynamics of the epidemic are closely captured by the
mean predicted incidence with PI50% envelope (we refer to Text S8
for a similar analysis using parameter sets sampled from the CI95%).
In addition, Fig. 2 (lower panel) reveals that although the extinc-
tion probability increases at the beginning of the epidemic and
during the inter-wave period (i.e. when the transmission chain can
be broken due to the low number of infectious hosts), the risk of
disease fadeout remains below 5%. By contrast, this risk rapidly
increases during the downturn of the second epidemic wave due
to depletion of the susceptible pool (i.e. most HR individuals have
gained long-term protection). We  can thus conclude that, despite
the small community size of TdC, the infection and HR dynamics
were robust to demographic stochasticity during the 1971 epi-
demic. Put another way, given the population settings of TdC, the
HR wave was  not a twist of fate but did have a high probability to
occur.
Interplay between the immunological and epidemiological
dynamics
Three typical epidemic proﬁles
The ﬁrst striking result of the exploration is that three typical
epidemic proﬁles can be distinguished, depending on the value
of R0. When the contact rate is high (R0 5), as on TdC, the epi-
demic is composed of two  waves with two distinct peaks (Fig. 4C).
By contrast, at intermediate contact rates (R0 ∈ [2 − 5]), the epi-
demic is composed of a single wave with a “long tail” end (Fig. 4B).
Finally, when the contact rate is low (R0 2), the tail disappears so
that the epidemic becomes bell shaped (Fig. 4A). These three epi-
demic proﬁles arise from the interplay between the immunological
and epidemiological dynamics that modulates the effective repro-
duction number Re(t) throughout the epidemic. For our model,
Re(t) = R0(S(t) + W(t))/  ˝ and as long as Re(t) > 1 the epidemic is
increasing.
In the parameter region of high R0 (Fig. 4C), the disease spreads
so rapidly that almost the entire population is infected over a short
time interval which is similar to the duration of the cellular protec-
tion. As a result, many recovered hosts lose their cellular protection
simultaneously, leading to an important inﬂow of unprotected indi-
viduals (Ud) shortly after the end of the infection wave. Accordingly,
Re rapidly increases so that, in the event that the chain of transmis-
sion is maintained until the threshold Re = 1 is reached, HR becomes
sustained and a second epidemic wave is observed.
By contrast, in the parameter region of low R0 (Fig. 4A), the
disease spreads over a much longer time scale than the immune
response so that Ud peaks during the downturn of the infection
wave. This timing, together with the low R0, help to explain why
Re remains below one after the ﬁrst epidemic peak. In this case, the
reinfection wave is not sustained but mainly driven by the infection
wave.
Finally, in the parameter region of intermediate R0 (Fig. 4B), the
disease spreads slowly enough that the reinfection wave is initially
driven by the infection wave while Ud is sufﬁcient to maintain the
chain of transmission after the end of the infection wave. However,
in contrast to the high R0 case, Re remains below one so that the
epidemic does not peak again, but subsides in a tail of reinfection.
The HR threshold
As shown in Fig. 5 (upper panel), the fraction of individuals
infected at least once during the epidemic (FI.) increases rapidly
with R0. In particular, the value of FI. is greater than expected with
a SEIR model since the latter does not account for new cases result-
ing from contact with reinfected hosts (the difference is plotted as
a dotted-line).
Regarding the fraction of the population that is reinfected (FII.,
middle panel) or that remains unprotected (FIS, lower panel) at
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Fig. 4. Example of the three typical epidemic proﬁles generated by the SEICWH model, depending on the value of R0. A: R0 = 1.4, B: R0 = 4 and C: R0 = 10. These values reﬂect
the  tendency of the contact rate among individuals to increase as the community becomes smaller. Upper panels: contribution of infection and HR to the time series of the
prevalence. The dashed line represents the average daily inﬂow of unprotected individuals (Ud). Lower panels: time course of the effective reproduction number Re(t). The
solid  line represents the threshold Re = 1, above which the epidemic can grow. (For interpretation of the references to color in text, the reader is referred to the web version
of  the article.)
the end of the epidemic, we note a qualitative change at inter-
mediate values of R0. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the HR threshold by
R∗0 = argmaxR0FIS(R0). When R0 < R∗0, most hosts have closed their
window of susceptibility before re-exposure to the virus whereas
most of those with deﬁcient humoral response are likely to escape
HR until the end of the epidemic and remains unprotected. By con-
trast, when R0 > R∗0, most hosts are likely to be re-exposed to the
virus before their window of susceptibility closes whereas most
unprotected hosts gain long-term immunity via HR during the sec-
ond epidemic wave. We  numerically calculated R∗0 = 3 under the
ML  estimates of the immunological parameters.
Finally, we contend that this HR threshold should not be con-
fused with the reinfection threshold introduced by Gomes et al.
(2004). Although both thresholds indicate important qualitative
change of the epidemic dynamics, we show in Text S9 that they
have different epidemiological interpretations as well as different
dynamical implications.
Implications for the ﬁrst post-pandemic season
Fig. 6 (upper panels) shows the expected fraction of individuals
infected at least once by a mutant during the ﬁrst post-pandemic
season (FI. post-pdm) as a function of the immune escape  and
the relative increase in transmissibility 
R0/R0, for ﬁve differ-
ent values of R0 in agreement with pandemic scenarios in large
populations (Lessler et al., 2007). As R0 increases the pandemic
becomes more and more severe so that the expected fraction
of protected individuals at the beginning of the post-pandemic
season (H) increases. Accordingly, from an evolutionary point
of view, it becomes more and more efﬁcient for the mutant
to increase its immune escape than its transmissibility in order
to invade the population. By contrast, when R0 is close to 1, a
mutant antigenically similar to the pandemic strain can invade
the population following moderate increase in transmissibil-
ity.
This pattern can be compared to that predicted by a SEIR model,
i.e. assuming that all the individuals infected during the pandemic
develop an efﬁcient humoral response and are therefore partially
protected against the mutant strain. One can show that, at the
beginning of the post-pandemic season, the SEIR model underesti-
mates the value of Re for the mutant strain by (R0 + 
R0)(1 − )
H,
where 
H = FIS is the fraction of unprotected hosts at the end
of pandemic season in the SEICWH model. Fig. 6 (lower pan-
els) reveals a parameter region, below the invasion threshold
(Re = 1) of the SEIR model, where the SEICWH model predicts epi-
demics involving up to 25% of the population. Furthermore, even
above this invasion threshold, the epidemic sizes differ by the
same order of magnitude as a typical seasonal inﬂuenza epidemic
(
FI. ≈ 5–20%).
Discussion
Immunodynamics model
Our study supports the view that host heterogeneity in the
timely development of a protective immunity can explain HR.
More precisely, although short lived (innate and cellular) immu-
nity should prevent HR within 2–3 weeks following the primary
infection (Cowling et al., 2012), incomplete immune formation and
non seroconversion can lead to HR following re-exposure to the
same strain on an intermediate and a long time-scale, respectively.
These mechanisms provide an explanation to the HR cases reported
over 2–5 weeks (Perez et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2010) as well as over
several months (Trakulsrichai et al., 2012) during the 2009 A/H1N1
pandemic.
To our knowledge, the present statistical analysis is the ﬁrst one
that attempts to provide joint estimates for the duration of the
short-term protection, the duration of the window of susceptibil-
ity and the probability to develop a long-term protection. Although
strong correlations between ω−1 and  ˛ prevent us from identify-
ing these key quantities with tight CI95%, our ML  estimate of  ˛ is
in very good agreement with empirical estimates in the literature.
Moreover, we  show in Text S7 that ﬁxing  ˛ around these empir-
ical estimates leads to much tighter CI95% for ω−1. We  have so
far assumed that hosts are fully susceptibility to HR while in the
window of susceptibility. In Text S10 we show that partial suscep-
tibility can be modelled by means of an extra parameter and has
the effect to lengthen the window of susceptibility. However, we
also found that this extra parameter suffers from serious identiﬁ-
ability issue and choose not to include it in the present SEICWH
model.
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Fig. 5. Change in the fractions of infected (FI. , upper panel), reinfected (FII. , middle
panel) and unprotected (FIS , lower panel) individuals at the end of the epidemic as
a  function of R0. Each colour refers to an epidemic proﬁle of Fig. 4 (bell: green, tail
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be  obtained by subtracting the same fraction expected under the SEIR model (solid
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pandemic (≈1.4, black triangle) and for the 1971 TdC epidemic (≈12, black dot) are
also mapped. Note the log-scale on the x-axis. (For interpretation of the references
to  color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web  version of the article.)
Finally, comparison of the immunological dynamics under the
best ﬁt model with empirical estimates from the 2009 pandemic
in the UK (Fig. 3) suggests that either (i) seroconversion occurred
more rapidly during the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic in the UK than
during the 1972 A/H3N2 epidemic on TdC or (ii) it should take a
higher HI titre than 32 for efﬁcient protection against HR. The ﬁrst
explanation could be justiﬁed by different immunogenic properties
between A/H1N1 and A/H3N2 as well as different immuno-genetic
background between the UK and TdC populations. However, we
note that ML  estimates of the immunological parameters for the
TdC epidemic are in close agreement with empirical literature (see
section “The primary immune response to inﬂuenza infection in
humans”). Accordingly, we believe that our estimates can reason-
ably be extended to other human populations and inﬂuenza viruses.
On the other hand, the second explanation is in good agreement
with the results of a recent meta-analysis showing that a HI titre of
32 corresponds to less than 50% reduction in the risk of contracting
inﬂuenza whereas it takes a titre of ≥100 to decrease this risk to 10%
(Coudeville et al., 2010). Similarly, we note that most labs outside
UK ﬁx the protective threshold at 40 instead of 32, thus increas-
ing the time to seroconversion while reducing the proportion of
seroconverted.
Does HR drive multiple-wave inﬂuenza outbreaks?
Our study indicates that HR could drive multiple-wave inﬂuenza
outbreaks in communities with exceptional contact conﬁgurations
like schools or isolated settlements. However, we have assumed
so far a constant contact rate between infected and susceptible (or
unprotected) individuals as well as no prior immunity to the new
virus. These assumptions seem justiﬁed for the isolated and close-
knit TdC community. Indeed, the high attack rate (96%) during the
1971 epidemic (Mantle and Tyrrell, 1973) suggests that those who
were infected at the beginning of the infection wave have rapidly
been re-exposed while caring for the sick during the inter-wave
period, thus initiating the HR wave. By contrast, we expect that
in less isolated and better prepared communities, past inﬂuenza
exposures and vaccination should reduce the number of suscepti-
ble individuals at the beginning of the epidemic, thus increasing
the HR threshold R∗0. On the other hand, distancing or contain-
ment measures should rapidly be implemented as the epidemic
progresses, thus considerably mitigating the risk of re-exposure.
For instance, school closure could rapidly drive the epidemic to
extinction, whereas rapid isolation of suspected cases could efﬁ-
ciently reduce the contact rate of infected host, thus preventing
the HR wave.
In line with these scenarios, no reinfection was reported dur-
ing an inﬂuenza outbreak that occurred in a boarding school of
763 boys in 1978 (one year after the re-emergence of A/H1N1)
despite the high attack rate (67%) (Anonymous, 1978). In this case,
infectious boys were conﬁned to bed and cared by 130 adults, pre-
sumably already immune as only one of them reported symptoms.
As a result, the epidemic died out after 13 days, while most of the
recovered boys would still have beneﬁted from a cellular protec-
tion (see Fig. S11). By contrast, in 1924, only 121 (13%) of 904 boys
of the Royal Navy School of Greenwich had already been infected
after 23 days of disease propagation (presumably because of the
high level of prior-immunity acquired since the 1918 pandemic),
when 40 new boys were distributed indiscriminately throughout
the school (Dudley, 1926). On the 26th day, two of this batch devel-
oped inﬂuenza, and within a week nine new boys had been infected.
Meanwhile the incidence among the old boys, which had previously
been on the wane, rose again, and 12 reinfections were reported.
Interestingly, a further batch of 40 new boys were introduced just
at the end of the epidemic, when the chances of infection must
have considerably diminished; six of these were ultimately infected
during the period in which 14 cases of infection and 4 cases of
reinfection were reported among the old boys (see Fig. S12). This
epidemic pattern can simply be explained by an increase of Re due
to the simultaneous effect of the replenishment of the susceptible
pool and the inﬂow of unprotected old boys.
On the other hand, our results clearly indicate that HR is not
sufﬁcient in itself to generate the multiple-wave outbreak patterns
observed during past pandemics in large populations. Indeed, R0
has been estimated around 2 (Lessler et al., 2007) which is below
the HR threshold R∗0. In these cases, HR would have only increased
the force of infection, and thus the number of infected hosts, by a
few percent. Once again, we  contend that our simple transmission
model willingly ignores many known mechanisms at work in larger
and more structured populations such as age-dependency in the
contact rate (Mossong et al., 2008) (i.e. heterogeneous mixing) and
behavioural changes (Funk et al., 2009). Furthermore, propagation
of a new inﬂuenza virus over several months must depend on sea-
sonal variations in transmissibility (i.e. change in absolute humidity
(Shaman and Kohn, 2009)) and contact rate (i.e. school closing and
reopening (Hens et al., 2009)) as well as meta-population coupling
(Balcan et al., 2009). Indeed, recent studies suggest that the timing
of the ﬁrst and second waves during the 2009 pandemic inﬂuenza
was controlled by a combination of these mechanisms (Chao et al.,
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2010; Shaman et al., 2010). Nevertheless, despite the simplicity of
our transmission model, we believe that our qualitative conclusions
on the role of HR in large populations (i.e. below the HR threshold)
remain valid even including these additional mechanisms.
The necessity to account for immunodynamics and host
heterogeneity in epidemiological models
In communities with exceptional contact rates, HR can rapidly
drive a second epidemic wave involving not only individuals with
deﬁcient humoral response but also those who  are re-exposed
before their humoral protection becomes efﬁcient. Accordingly, the
risk of a wave of reinfection cannot be anticipated without a pre-
cise description of the immunodynamics that follows recovery from
inﬂuenza infection as in the SEICWH model. By contrast, in larger
and less mixed populations, HR does not signiﬁcantly alter the epi-
demiological dynamics so that a simple SEIR framework should be
sufﬁcient to predict or infer (retrospectively) the impact of a new
virus in these populations.
On the other hand, one should also bear in mind that the SEIR
model overestimates the level of population immunity at the end
of the pandemic by assuming that all infected hosts develop a pro-
tective humoral response. Accordingly, our results indicate that
consideration of host heterogeneity in the humoral response is
essential in order to anticipate the impact of a mutant in the
post-pandemic era. In addition, this would permit to quantify
the fraction of infected hosts that should remain unprotected
after a pandemic and could therefore beneﬁt from vaccination in
order to boost their humoral response. Although it seems difﬁcult
to separate protected from unprotected hosts without individual
serological tests, we can nonetheless assume that random vaccina-
tion of symptomatic cases should, in principle, increase population
herd immunity through cross-immunity to subsequent antigenic
variants.
The SEICWH model represents a step forward in the consid-
eration of the immune response, and its heterogeneity among
individuals, in epidemiological models. However, further research
and reﬁnements could be envisaged to improve its realism. First,
reinfected hosts may  beneﬁt from T-cell “memory” and be less
infectious than infected hosts, and even more often asymptomatic,
thus reducing their risk to transmit the disease. Second, host het-
erogeneity in the development of a protective humoral response
could vary depending on the immunogenic properties of each
inﬂuenza virus and the population under study. For instance, it was
recently reported that although 90% of the infected hosts in the age
range 16–29 seroconverted during the 2009 pandemic, this pro-
portion decreased to 70% for those aged 50 years and over (Hung
et al., 2010). Finally, although we  have assumed a life-long humoral
protection once in the H stage, the same study conducted dur-
ing the 2009 pandemic also revealed that 7 and 16% of patients
who seroconverted had a decline of antibody titre of 4- and 2-fold,
respectively, after one year (Hung et al., 2010). As for the lack of
immune response, this additional mechanism could have signiﬁ-
cant implications for the current post-pandemic era by increasing
the effective reproduction number of subsequent nH1N1 variants.
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